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Summary. This paper presents a novel methodology to test the security of the Diffie-Hellman
public key exchange protocol. The security of many cryptographic schemes rely on the hard-
ness of this problem. We are presenting a purely statistical test to compare this problem in
different groups. We are using groups included in Zp with p prime as a major example, how-
ever the methods presented are not restricted to these groups. The presentation of the results
is primarily intended to introduce novel applications of statistical methodologies to the area
of mathematical cryptography. As such we will emphasize the cryptographical aspects of the
work more than the statistical notions.
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1. Introduction.
Informally, through a key exchange protocol, two parties A and B agree on a common key
KA,B pooled from a set S while communicating over an insecure channel. Once the key
is established, any further information shared between the parties is encoded, transmitted
and decoded using the key KA,B. The protocol is secure if any third party C with access to
the initial communication between A and B cannot tell apart KA,B from any other value
in the set S. This guarantees that it is computationally unfeasible for an outside adversary
to gain “any” partial information on KA,B.
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol Diffie and Hellman (1976) is a primary ex-
ample of a public key exchange protocol. In its most basic form, the protocol chooses a
finite cyclic group (G, ·) of order N , with generator g, where · denotes the group opera-
tion. In what follows we chose the multiplicative operation to denote the operation in the
group, and thus the group G is generated by the powers of g (i.e., G = {g0, g1, . . . , gN−1}),
symbolically G =< g >. Note that G, g and N are public information.
The participants in the information transfer A and B each randomly chooses an integer
a ∈ [1, N ] and b ∈ [1, N ] independently. Then A computes ga, B computes gb and exchange
these elements of G over an insecure channel. Since each of A and B knows their respective
a and b they can compute gab, which or a publicly known derivation KA,B of that becomes
the public key.
†The authors wish to thank Dr. Marco Lenci who suggested us the use of the entropy function
as a quantifier for random information.
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Any method of converting gab to KA,B is publicly known, and the security of the key
KA,B is directly dependent on the security of g
ab, therefore for the sake of simplicity we
will consider gab as the established key of the exchange for the rest of this paper.
In the present article we will be concerned with the security of this protocol. We will
interpret security in a probabilistic manner and will devise a statistical test that will “assess”
the security of the exchange in a given group.
In the cryptology literature there are two concepts of security – the core security and the
concept of semantic security which leads to various security models. The semantic security
and the related concepts come under the name of “provable security” (Koblitz and Menezes,
2004, Section 2). The core security of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol depends
on the discrete logarithm problem, the computational Diffie-Hellman problem and the de-
cision Diffie-Hellman problem. In this article we are concerned with the core security of the
exchange. We give a brief introduction to the discrete logarithm problem and the computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman problem, for more on these a reader can look at (Koblitz and Menezes,
2004, Section 5) or (Stinson, 2005, Chapter 6).
Assumption 1 (DL). For a cyclic group G, generated by g, we are given g and gn,
n ∈ N, the challenge is to compute n.
Assumption 2 (CDH). Given g, ga, gb it is hard to compute gab.
Clearly, if these assumptions are not satisfied then C, an adversary‡, can gain access to
the key gab. The relationship between these two assumptions has been extensively studied.
It is clear that the CDH assumption will not be satisfied in a group where finding the
discrete logarithm solution is easy. In Maurer and Wolf (1999), Boneh and Lipton (1996),
the authors show that in several settings the validity of the CDH assumption and the
hardness of the discrete logarithm problem are in fact equivalent.
Unfortunately, the DL and the CDH assumptions are not enough to ensure security of the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. Even if these assumptions are true, the eavesdropper
C may still be able to gain useful information about gab. For example, if C can predict 90%
of the bits in gab with high probability then for all intents and purposes the key exchange
protocol is broken. Moreover, there exist protocols where the knowledge of even one bit will
break its security (some Casino electronic games). With the current state of knowledge we
cannot be confident that assuming only CDH, a scenario like the one described above does
not exist (Boneh (1998)).
1.1. Our main contribution.
Lemma 2.1 states that the security of the Diffie Hellman exchange protocol is best studied
from a statistical perspective. We introduce a statistical treatment of this particularly
important problem in cryptography and it is our hope that many more problems will be
approached in a similar fashion.
We present novel methodologies to help asses the security of the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol in a given group (G, ·). In Section 2 we present the statistical criteria we
use as well as the relevance and connection with the security assessment. Sections 3 and 4
present statistical tests to check the validity of the statistical criteria presented in Section
‡ There are various concepts of adversary in cryptographic literature, the power and authority
they have. In this article we assume that our adversary is a passive eavesdropper.
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2. In particular, Subsection 4.1 detail the use of the permutation testing methodology
to calculate concrete values for the probability of Type I error of the tests. This section
contains the important idea that the method can be used to compare the security of the DH
key exchange protocol in two or more different groups. Furthermore, the groups which we
use to perform the comparison do not need to have the same operational structure. Thus,
in principle, it is possible to compare the security of the exchange in finite groups generated
using elliptical curves versus the same order prime subgroups of Zn, n ∈ N. We do not
pursue this direction in the presented work.
Section 5 applies the methodology we develop to some examples where the security of
the DH-exchange has been conjectured. It is found that the results obtained strengthen the
conjectured hypotheses. Finally, in Section 6 we present general conclusions and directions
of future research.
The treatment of the problem is based on the empirical distribution of the key gab. We
mention that a better approach from the cryptographic perspective would be to look at the
distribution of a collection of bits in the binary expansion of gab. We believe our methods
could be extended and applied to this representation as well.
2. Statistical criteria to asses the security of the Diffie Hellman key exchange pro-
tocol.
In its most basic form described above the security of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol relies on an approximate identification of the key gab from the public information
g, ga, gb. In statistical terms there exist a clear concept that answers the question of
identification: statistical independence. Therefore a sufficient condition for the security of
the DH key exchange is:
Assumption 3 (DH-Independence). Given a cyclic group G of order N , generated
by g, let a and b be chosen independently, uniformly at random from the set {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Then the random variables (ga, gb) and gab are independent.
For a given set S we will use the notation DU(S) to denote the discrete uniform distri-
bution on the elements of S. With this notation a and b are independent random variables
with the DU({1, 2, . . . , N}) distribution.
Clearly this is a sufficient condition for the security of the Diffie Hellman key exchange
protocol. There is no information to be gained about gab from seeing (ga, gb). Unfortunately,
as one’s intuition may indicate, this assumption is rejected for any finite group G we have
looked at. In the next section we construct a statistical test for this assumption which will
help introduce the notations and the further testing procedures.
If the assumption presented above is not true, hope is not lost. The DH-Independence
assumption is a sufficient condition. In fact, in the cryptographic literature this assumption
is not even mentioned, however a weaker necessary condition is presented:
Assumption 4 (DDH). Given g, ga, gb and an element z ∈ G it is hard to decide
whether or not z = gab.
In this form the DDH assumption constitutes a necessary condition for the security of
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. Furthermore, Joux and Nguyen (2003) construct
groups based on elliptic curves where the DDH assumption is not satisfied while the CDH
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and the discrete logarithm problem are proven to be equivalent and hard. This fact prompts
the necessity to directly check the validity of the DDH assumption for a given group.
The DDH assumption is assumed, either implicitly or explicitly in many cryptographic
systems and protocols. Applications include: the many implementations of the DH key ex-
change itself (e.g., Diffie et al. (1992)), the El-Gamal encryption scheme El-Gamal (1984),
the undeniable signatures algorithm Chaum and van Antwerpen (1989), Feldsman’s verifi-
able secret sharing protocol Feldman (1987), Pedersen (1991), and many others; we point
to Naor and Reingold (1997) for a more detailed list.
Notice that the DDH assumption in the form presented above is a little vague because
of the use of the predicate, “hard to decide”. Surprisingly, attempts to make the DDH
assumption explicit were not made until late after its formulation in Diffie and Hellman
(1976). The first ventures (Boneh and Lipton, 1996) use standard cryptographic machinery
(Yao (1982); Goldwasser and Micali (1984)), to express the assumption in terms of compu-
tational indistinguishability. Put in this traditional cryptographic form it was discovered
quickly by Stadler (1996) and independently Naor and Reingold (1997) that if one assumes
the existence of a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm which distinguishes the real key
gab from the other possible values even with a very small probability§ (for all the possible
inputs), then another polynomial time algorithm can be constructed from the first which
will output gab with a very large (almost one) probability. The only requirement is that
the size of the group is known, requirement lessened by Boneh (1998) which only requires
finiteness of the group.
All this evidence points toward a more specific definition based entirely on the notion
of statistical significance. Indeed, this fact materialized in a series of papers Canetti et al.
(1999, 2000); Friedlander and Shparlinski (2001); Vasco et al. (2004), which call this new
form of the assumption the Diffie Hellman Indistinguishability assumption (DHI). We note
that Gennaro et al. (2004); Joux and Nguyen (2003) use the same form except it continues
to call it DDH. We point the reader to H˚astad et al. (1999) for a detailed discussion on
the concept of statistical significance versus computational significance; in the context of
pseudo-random number generation.
For our purposes of studying the security of the Diffie Hellman exchange we will use the
following assumption:
Assumption 5 (DHI). Given g, ga, gb the distribution of gab is indistinguishable from
the Discrete Uniform distribution on the elements of G (DU(G)).
The notion of indistinguishability used here is the usual statistical one. Two variables are
indistinguishable if they have essentially the same distribution, or put formally, X1 and X2
are indistinguishable if their distribution functions Fi(x) = P (Xi ≤ x) with i = 1, 2 have
the property:
F1(x) = F2(x), for all x ∈ R \ (A1 ∪ A2),
§but not negligible. For the sake of completeness we give here the whole definition. It is presented
in the footnote since it is not relevant to our approach at all. Suppose that the group G where
the exchange takes place has order N and n = log
2
N . It is said that a probabilistic algorithm
A decides on the right key with small (non-negligible) probability if there exist a polynomial
expression p(·) such that for any r ∈ G:
˛
˛
˛Prob(A outputs g
ab)− Prob(A outputs r)
˛
˛
˛ >
1
p(n)
.
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where A1, A2 are the sets which contain the discontinuity points of F1(·), respectively
F2(·). Applied to our specific case the distributions are discrete, therefore the distribution
functions F1 and F2 are just step functions with jumps in a compact set in R, thus using the
right continuity of the distribution functions, the usual definition translates here in equality
everywhere. We conclude that in our context, indistinguishability means that the variables
have the same distribution.
This formulation is perfectly natural for a statistician who tries to express the DDH for-
mulation presented above. We note that our version of the DHI assumption requires that the
conditional distribution (gab|ga, gb, g) is uniform while the previous articles Canetti et al.
(1999, 2000); Friedlander and Shparlinski (2001); Vasco et al. (2004); Gennaro et al. (2004);
Joux and Nguyen (2003) require that the distribution of the triple (ga, gb, gab| g) be Discrete
Uniform on the elements of G×G×G = G3 (DU(G3)). Given an outcome (x, y, z) we can
write using the simple multiplicative rule:
P
(
ga = x, gb = y, gab = z| g
)
= P
(
gab = z| ga = x, gb = y, g
)
P
(
ga = x, gb = y| g
)
(1)
Under the original condition that a and b are DU({1, . . . , N}) and using the fact that g is
a generator for G then the distribution of (ga, gb| g) is DU(G2), thus the two formulations
are perfectly equivalent.
It is known that in general statistical indistinguishability implies computational indis-
tinguishability, but the reverse is not in general true, (Goldreich, 2001, Section 3.2.2). The
following lemma states the same result in our specific case using the assumptions presented
in this section: DHI and DDH.
Lemma 2.1. In a group G of order N , if the DHI assumption is true then the DDH
assumption is true as well.
Proof. Assume that DHI is true in G, then for given ga, gb, the probability
P
(
gab = z|ga, gb
)
= 1/N for any z ∈ G. This is the hardest possible scenario in the DDH
assumption and hence we claim that DDH is satisfied.
This lemma says that in any group G, DHI is a stronger¶ condition than that of the DDH
assumption. If we look at the proof closely then we will see that the difference between the
DDH and the DHI consists in the fact that a measure of hardness has been provided in the
DDH assumption via the uniform distribution.
3. Testing for DH-Independence.
We give general definitions, then we go to our specific case.
LetX , Y , and Z be three discrete random variables taking values in the sets {x1, x2, . . . , xn},
{y1, y2, . . . , ym}, {z1, z2, . . . , zl} respectively. Denote with:
p(xi, yi, zi) = P{X = xi, Y = yi, Z = zi}, ∀ i, j, k
the joint probability function corresponding to (X,Y, Z). With usual notations we denote
p(yj|xi), p(xi, yj |zk), etc. the conditional probability functions of X |Y , (X,Y )|Z, etc.
Furthermore, assume that for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l} the marginal distribution p(zk) = P{Z =
zk} 6= 0 to avoid complications conditioning on a set of measure zero.
¶or at least as strong
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Definition 3.1 (Entropy). We define the joint and conditional measures of un-
certainty.
H (X,Y ) = −
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
l∑
k=1
p(xi, yj, zk) log p(xi, yj) (2)
H (X,Y |Z) = −
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
l∑
k=1
p(xi, yj, zk) log p(xi, yj |zk), (3)
with the convention 0(−∞) = 0.
In the above definition we choose to work with the natural logarithm, however any other
basis will be equivalent for our purpose due to the constant in the usual definition of the
entropy function (see Shannon (1948)).
Lemma 3.2. The following property holds for the above uncertainty measures: H(X,Y |Z) ≤
H(X,Y ) with equality if and only if (X,Y ) and Z are independent.
The proof is an easy exercise in probability, the reader is directed to Shannon (1948) or
Rokhlin (1967) for more details.
Lemma 3.2 gives a clear criterion for our first test. More specifically: assume that the
number of elements in G is N , i.e. |G| = N . As an example |Z∗p| = p− 1.
The plan is to apply the above lemma with X = ga, Y = gb and Z = gab. Since both
participants in the Diffie-Hellman protocol choose a and b at random and g is the generator
of G we can assume that ga and gb are independent and their distribution is DU(G). Thus,
the distribution of (ga, gb) is DU(G×G). This in turn implies that p(xi, yj) = 1/N
2 for all
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and thus the first entropy measure (2) becomes:
H
(
ga, gb
)
= −
∑
i,j,k
p(xi, yj, zk) log
1
N2
= 2 logN (4)
At this point we can devise a test of the hypotheses:{
H0 : g
ab is independent of (ga, gb)
Ha : g
ab is NOT independent of (ga, gb)
(5)
using Lemma 3.2. The test in (5) is equivalent with:{
H0 : H(g
a, gb| gab) = 2 logN
Ha : H(g
a, gb| gab) < 2 logN
(6)
The question is: how do we proceed with this test? Since all the distributions are finite,
in theory at least, we could calculate p(xi, yj|zk) for all the possible triples in G×G×G = G
3.
If we had these quantities it would be a simple matter to calculate H(ga, gb|gab) according
to (3).
Denote this value based on the whole set G3 by TN . The test will then compare this
value with 2 logN . If equal then the variables are independent and the DH-Independence
assumption is satisfied. If smaller then we could not prove independence of the variables.
At this point let us make two important remarks.
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Remark 3.3. In the definition of the entropy functions (2) and (3) we did not use the
structure of the group G in any way, only the relative frequency of the elements in the
group. This fact make the methods based on the entropy function well suited for comparison
between diverse groups. We will take advantage of this feature later in this paper.
Remark 3.4. In practice if we wish to calculate TN we have to calculate all the possible
values for (ga, gb) and this will take longer than an exhaustive search. Thus calculating TN
is not practical, instead we would have to estimate it. We will detail the estimation in the
next section.
Alas, as we suspected from the beginning, implementing this first test tells us that
(ga, gb) and gab are not independent in every group that we tried. For example in Z∗p with
multiplication, calculating TN the entropy in (3) for p ∈ {1193, 2131, 11093}will yield values
which are far apart from 2 log(p−1). In fact when looking at the values obtained we see that
they are close to log(p − 1) thus the value of our first test increases with p. The closeness
of the test to log(p − 1) is an interesting experimental fact. This fact is investigated and
explained by our second test presented in the next section.
4. Testing the DHI assumption
If the DH-Independence assumption is satisfied in a given group G, then we could stop and
decide that we found a perfect group for the Diffie Hellman key exchange. However, the
experimental procedures and our intuition point out that the DH-Independence assumption
is never satisfied in any finite group G. The next task is to obtain a statistical testing
procedure to verify the validity of the DHI assumption in a given group G. The idea is to use
the entropy function (3) in the sense of Kullback-Leibler divergence Kullback and Leibler
(1951) as a measure of departure from the entropy calculated under the hypothesis of
Uniform distribution. Specifically, using earlier notation, we wish to construct a statistical
test that will check the validity of the following hypotheses:{
H0 : The distribution of g
ab| (ga, gb) is DU(G)
Ha : The distribution of g
ab| (ga, gb) is NOT DU(G)
(7)
Let us denote the elements of G as {g1, g2, . . . , gN}. Suppose we can look at all the
possible triples (ga, gb, gab) when a, b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} take all the possible values. Clearly,
there are N2 such possible triples and assuming that a and b are chosen at random, each
such triple will have probability 1/N2. The last element in the triple gab will get mapped
into N possible values (the elements of G). Thus, some values in G will be repeated. For
an element gk ∈ G denote mk the number of times gk appears in the place of g
ab among
all the N2 triples. We have then
∑
k mk = N
2. For any pair (ga, gb) that corresponds to
gab = gk we can then calculate the conditional probability as:
p(ga = gi, g
b = gj | g
ab = gk) =
1
mk
1A(gi, gj, gk),
where A is the set of all possible N2 tuples
(
ga, gb, gab
)
, and we have used the notation
1A(x) to denote the indicator function of the set A ⊂ Ω, i.e., 1A : Ω→ {0, 1} is given by:
1A(x) =
{
1 if x ∈ A
0 if x 6∈ A
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We can continue:
H
(
ga, gb|gab
)
= −
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
p(gi, gj, gk) log p(gi, gj|gk)
= −
N∑
k=1
N∑
i,j=1
1
N2
log
1
mk
1A(gi, gj , gk)
= −
N∑
k=1
mk
N2
log
1
mk
. (8)
Under the null hypothesis H0, the distribution of (g
ab| ga, gb) is uniform, therefore we
should have the mk multiplicities equal. This automatically implies that mk = N for all
k’s and then the entropy function in (8) is:
H
(
ga, gb|gab
)
= −
N∑
k=1
1
N
log
1
N
= logN
The testing statistics is:
TN = H
(
ga, gb| gab
)
− logN =
N∑
k=1
mk
N2
logmk − logN. (9)
This test is based on the whole set of values in G2. Accordingly, if the value of the test
equals zero then the null hypothesis H0 is true, any other value of the test will support the
alternative hypothesis. We summarize this result in the following:
Lemma 4.1 (Testing Procedure). With the previous notations if TN = 0 then the
DHI assumption is satisfied in a given group G.
Both remarks 3.3 and 3.4 certainly apply for this testing procedure as well. In particular,
remark 3.4 means that we have to find procedures to estimate TN instead of calculating it.
This will introduce distributions and we detail the approach next.
4.1. The permutation test approach.
Assume that we can obtain a sample of n pairs {(ai, bi)}i∈{1,2,...,n} from {1, 2, . . . , N} ×
{1, 2, . . . , N}. For each pair in the sample we can calculate the triple (gai , gbi , gaibi). Let
An be the set of all the triplets in the sample.
Using (8) we can calculate an estimate of H
(
ga, gb|gab
)
using:
pˆn(gi, gj, gk) =
kijk
n
1An(gi, gj, gk), (10)
pˆn(gi, gj| gk) =
kijk
mk
1An(gi, gj, gk),
where once again mk denotes the multiplicity of gk, but in the given sample of n obser-
vations. We took into account the possibilities of obtaining repeated observations in the
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sample by multiplying with the factor kijk ; which represents the number of times we see
the same observation (gi, gj , gk) in our sample.
The test statistic is:
Tn = −
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
pˆn(gi, gj, gk) log pˆn(gi, gj |gk)− logn (11)
All that is left, is to investigate the distribution of Tn under the null hypothesis H0.
Under the null hypothesis the mk’s are the multiplicities of gk’s in a sample of size n drawn
from the set
{g1, . . . , g1, g2, . . . , g2, . . . , gN , . . . , gN}
where each element in the group G are repeated N times.
Let us denote M1,M2, . . . ,MN the multiplicities of the elements {g1, g2, . . . , gN} in
a sample of size n. It is not hard to show that the joint probability distribution of
(M1, . . . ,MN ) is the so called multivariate hypergeometric distribution:
P (M1 = m1, . . . ,MN = mN ) =
(
N
m1
)(
N
m2
)
. . .
(
N
mN
)(
N2
n
)
The test statistic under H0 is:
T̂n =
N∑
k=1
Mk
n
logMk − logn. (12)
If we would be able to calculate the distribution of Tn knowing that (M1,M2, . . . ,MN )
are multivariate hypergeometric then we would be in position to reach the conclusion of
the test of uniformity (7) by calculating the p-value of the test statistic (11) using this
distribution.
Finding the distribution of the test statistic under H0 (12) is however not an easy task.
This is the reason we propose the use of permutation testing for which knowledge of this
distribution is not necessary.
The permutation testing procedure generates samples (M1,M2, . . . ,MN) from the Mul-
tivariate hypergeometric distribution. For each sample, it calculates the corresponding value
of the test statistic under the null hypothesis as in (12). These values are obtained from
the assuminption that H0 is true; this allow us to calculate the empirical distribution of
our sample statistic Tn under the null hypothesis. The p-value of our test is given by the
proportion of values as extreme or more than the one calculated in (11) using the group G.
A small p-value is an evidence against the null hypothesis in (7), that the sample comes
from a uniform distribution. We summarize the procedure bellow:
Testing procedure to determine validity of DHI for a group G
(i) We take a sample of size n and we calculate the test statistic as in (11).
(ii) We generate many test statistic values under the hypothesis H0 is true using (12),
then construct their empirical distribution.
(iii) We calculate the p-value of the test as the proportion of values in the empirical
distribution found in (ii) lower than the test value found using G in (i).
(iv) If the p-value is small we reject the DHI assumption. If the p-value is big we did not
find evidence that the DHI is not satisfied in the given group G.
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4.2. How to compare two or more groups?
We will note at this point that the absolute value of the test |TN | and its estimate |Tn|
represent a measure of departure from the Discrete Uniform distribution. The bigger the
estimate the further is the distance from the uniform distribution and the weaker is the
validity of the DHI assumption. Remark 3.3 also tells us that the nature of the group
operation is irrelevant for the testing procedure. Therefore, we can use the test as a tool to
compare the strength of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol in two or more groups.
To be able to do so we need the order of the groups compared to be similar and, more
importantly, the sample size on the basis of which we calculate the permutation test to be
the same. We take advantage of the ability to compare different groups in the next section.
5. Testing the DHI assumption in Z∗p
We are going to check the efficiency of the testing procedure for the most useful finite
groups, those included in Z∗p with the multiplicative operation. We present the following
examples as a way for checking the validity of the testing procedure.
Example 5.1 (A group where the DDH assumption does not hold.). Consider
G = Z∗p with p prime. It is known that computing Legendre symbol in this group gives a
distinguisher against DDH (Gennaro et al. (2004)).
Example 5.2 (A group where the DDH assumption is conjectured to hold).
We currently do not know any DDH distinguisher for a prime order subgroup of Z∗p. There-
fore, given p and q prime with g divisor of p− 1 it is conjectured that in a subgroup of order
q of Z∗p the DDH assumption holds.
We start with a given group G and using the test presented in the previous section we
will test for the validity of the DHI assumption in that group G. This should provide a
strong indication towards the security of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol in that
group.
5.1. The rate of convergence of the testing procedure
The first thing we investigate is the rate of convergence for our test. To do this we need to
calculate the true value of TN and thus we have to look at small groups.
For space consideration we are presenting only results obtained for p = 1193 in Table 1
in the Appendix. The sample sizes are presented in the first column of the table and the
corresponding sample entropy value Tn in column two. Column 3 presents the proportion
of values lower than Tn – an entry equal to 1 corresponds to a p-value 0 of the test. The
fourth value in the table represents the distance from Tn to the center of the distribution
of entropy values calculated under H0. Finally, the last value represents the ratio of the
distance in column four, to the distance from the sample entropy Tn to the furthest away
point in the distribution. It is an indication on how many standard deviations away Tn is
from the distribution.
There are two remarkable features of these values – one, we see that the test rejects the
null hypothesis that the distribution of (gab| ga, gb) is uniform on the elements of G; the
other remarkable feature is that we determine this fact based on a sample of 354 values
or about one third of the value of N = 1192. In the second place if we wish to determine
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Fig. 1. Comparison of the test values for different sample sizes and Z∗p’s
the actual entropy distance from the two distributions – a feature that will be useful when
comparing two or more groups; we can see that starting with a sample size of n = 3304 (or
about 3 times N) we start to obtain accurate results.
To illustrate better the rate of convergence for some other groups we plot in Figure 1
the evolution of the test values with the size of the sample. This figure suggest that to get
a good estimate for TN the sample size will depend on the size of the group, for example
we need a larger sample size for Z∗11903 than we need for Z
∗
1193. In addition, the same figure
points out another interesting fact.
Following example 5.1 we know that Z∗p is not secure. It is also conjectured that some
groups are more secure than others. Looking at the problem from that perspective, for
which groups are more easily broken using the Legendre symbol, it is also assumed that by
increasing the size of the group one can make the group more secure.
We can see from the figure that the second assertion is not true. Just increasing the size
of the group does not make it more secure. Remembering that a smaller relative distance
corresponds to closeness to the Discrete uniform distribution on the elements of G, we
see from the Figure 1 that while Z∗11903 the largest group is the most secure of the three,
the situation between the other two groups is not what we would have expected looking
at the size of the group alone. Even though Z∗2131 is the larger group (almost twice the
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size), it is also less secure from the DHI assumption perspective than Z∗
1193
. This indicate
that the choice of the group G rather than the size of it is essential for the security of the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol.
5.2. Comparison of the DHI assumption across groups.
Next we wished to give an indication of groups that are more secure than others. It is
known that considering only the Legendre symbol criterion the safest groups among Z∗p are
the ones obtained when p is a safe prime i.e., of the form p = 2q + 1 where q is another
prime Menezes et al. (1996).
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Fig. 2. Histogram of all the test values for Z∗p with 2000 < p < 4000. Values closer to zero represent
safer groups for DH exchange.
We wished to test this theory for a large set of Z∗p groups with varying p’s. We looked
at all primes between 2000 and 4000, and again for primes between 9000 and 11000. The
reason for the two separate segments of primes is that we expect some sort of consistency
between them. We show the distribution of the test values for these groups separated into
safe and not safe primes in Figures 2 and 3.
First, we notice that the behavior of primes in the range 2000 to 4000 is very similar
with the primes for the higher range 9000 to 11000. Second, in both ranges we see the same
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Fig. 3. Histograms of test values obtained for Z∗p with 9000 < p < 11000. Values closer to zero
represent safer groups for DH exchange.
conclusion applies, the safe prime groups are more secure than any other groups. However,
the test estimate obtained for each of the safe prime groups is significantly different from
zero therefore there is no safe group in the ranges given for which the DHI assumption is
verified. This seem to confirm the assertion in the Example 5.1.
Next, we will look to Example 5.2. We will use our test for the prime subgroups of each
of the safe primes in the range 9000 to 11000. More specifically, we look at each Z∗p with p
a safe prime, and we construct the prime subgroup of order q in each such group. Then we
test the DHI assumption in each subgroup thus constructed. The values obtained for the
distances are plotted in the upper histogram of Figure 4. We mention that the behavior of
the test values for primes between 2000 and 4000 was very similar, for space consideration
we omit the corresponding plot. All the values are obtained using the same sample size
n = 8× 106. The reason for this particular value is that while the groups themselves are in
the range 9000 to 11000, the subgroups are of order 4500 to 5500.
It is remarkable to see that these subgroups are clearly safer for the DH exchange than
any other groups plotted in the picture. The results seem to confirm the conjecture in the
Example 5.2. However, the actual test of uniformity was rejected, but we needed a very
large sample size almost equal to the maximum value N2.
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Fig. 4. Comparing values of the test for different type of groups when 9000 < p < 11000. On top,
we plot values for prime subgroups of Z∗p when p is a safe prime. Middle, we plot values for safe
prime Z∗p’s. On bottom, values for all the other groups Z∗p in the range given. Values closer to zero
represent better groups for DH exchange.
For a better comparison we plotted in Figure 5 on page 15 only the histogram of the
values obtained for the prime subgroups of the Z∗p with p a safe prime (top) and the
histogram of the values obtained for the Z∗p groups, p a safe prime between 9000 and 11000
(bottom).
It is remarkable the closeness of these values to each other considering that the order of
the group varies between 9000 and 11000 a 20% variation in size. This is an encouraging
fact, which suggests that for even larger p’s we will see the same sort of consistency in the
values. This will imply that groups with the same operational structure will have similar
behavior from the point of view of the Diffie-Hellman security. However, there is a variation
in the values as illustrated in the Figure 4 on page 14 which represent the histogram of the
values obtained for the prime subgroup of Z∗p groups, with p a safe prime varying between
9000 and 11000.
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Fig. 5. A more detailed comparison of the previous image (Fig. 4). We are comparing the prime
subgroups with the corresponding safe groups. Values closer to zero represent safer groups for DH
exchange.
6. Conclusion and future work.
In this article we present a novel statistical testing procedure to help assess the security
of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. The methods presented are quite general
and to our knowledge represent the first systematic pure applied statistical approach to a
cryptographic problem. The article is intended to open a way for methods coming from
statistical world to the cryptographic domain. We do not claim to solve the security of
the Diffie-Hellman exchange protocol. What we have presented are primarily sufficient
conditions for the security. We also presented a way to compare the strength of these
conditions in different groups. In Section 5 we show that among the groups we looked at,
only the prime subgroups of a large group are close to fulfilling the conditions considered.
An obvious lack in our results is a statistical analysis for very large primes. Typically the
groups used in cryptography are of the order at least 21024. The use of our testing procedure,
ad-literam as presented in section 4 prevents us from such an analysis, however currently
we are investigating directions of circumventing the permutation testing approach. One
direction is to approximate the distribution of the test in (12) with a multinomial distribu-
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Fig. 6. A blowup of the histogram of the values for the prime subgroups in the safe primes. Note the
values are close to zero but not equal to zero.
tion, then use a multivariate normal distribution for a second approximation. This should
allow us to calculate the p-value of the test directly without the need of the permutation
testing. Another direction is to put together outcomes into coarser groups and look at the
distribution of these groups of outcomes. This idea is similar in result with the approach of
Canetti et al. (1999); Banks et al. (2006), and should allow us to speed up the procedure in
order to apply it to much larger groups. It will also allow us to look at the distribution of
the binary representation of prime subgroups of a large group, and extend the methodology
to finite groups defined using elliptical curves.
7. Appendix
We present the actual values obtained in Zp when p = 1193 in Table 1.
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Table 1: Results for Z∗1193
Sample size n Sample entropy value p-value Distance to center Relative distance
59 0.046993 0.556 0 0
118 0.105734 0.904 0 0
354 0.280115 1 0.0867205869841293 0.602176619941004
885 0.532425 1 0.088729342259792 0.599662439145006
1829 0.96382 1 0.158395336513686 0.758210206038124
3304 1.40654 1 0.187918729961140 0.890429900342397
5428 1.82531 1 0.194266177572582 0.935988768705612
8319 2.19741 1 0.181355529391107 0.952411456549936
12095 2.55884 1 0.192004761885750 0.966980890255525
16874 2.87286 1 0.187337211259202 0.979981576295216
22774 3.1674 1 0.191522958630831 0.981517705830948
29913 3.43077 1 0.188465586935031 0.98875796589123
38409 3.67754 1 0.189706561218385 0.989433516631953
48380 3.90781 1 0.192416008075197 0.99165124060656
59944 4.11938 1 0.19204137533093 0.99478104337756
73219 4.31302 1 0.187468331653386 0.994755817256502
88323 4.50025 1 0.188526799093478 0.996560990251708
105374 4.67745 1 0.19031690687346 0.996854516374416
124490 4.84304 1 0.190069869416784 0.997275184401866
145789 5.00357 1 0.193382446593161 0.997349334367475
169389 5.14947 1 0.189808592541566 0.997931831476642
195408 5.29352 1 0.191440055573543 0.998590870156603
223964 5.42925 1 0.191148605525655 0.998411134116565
255175 5.55893 1 0.190698438462096 0.998845341861062
289159 5.68315 1 0.190158376706143 0.998956167303273
326034 5.80232 1 0.189542921352024 0.99921427003345
365918 5.91821 1 0.190224685898690 0.999099568272852
408929 6.03153 1 0.192585342387550 0.99931590521473
455185 6.13611 1 0.190147697214377 0.999413667702933
504804 6.2378 1 0.188502041891033 0.999534588253575
557904 6.34038 1 0.191174900210519 0.999622308526143
614603 6.43583 1 0.189935678716927 0.999625957882701
675019 6.53032 1 0.190747522920258 0.99976657291958
739270 6.62041 1 0.189993001424682 0.99970573975723
807474 6.70913 1 0.190533231900746 0.999813379231167
879749 6.79349 1 0.189228458019329 0.999814900993474
956213 6.87841 1 0.190858660137478 0.99984125150255
1036984 6.95729 1 0.188695781636576 0.999914186731075
1122180 7.03801 1 0.190502664400493 0.999926167521206
1211919 7.11461 1 0.190209994699298 0.99994757464427
1306319 7.18871 1 0.189337283972479 0.999979948549426
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